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ing an administrative order to be passed upon by a jury where such
order constitutes an essential element of a crime. The constitutional
guarantees of a jury determination of all the essential elements of
a crime are thus preserved.
William Jack Stevens

Criminal Law-Kidnapping
The Ds entered *the complaintants' car and forced them to
drive twenty-seven blocks. During the trip the Ds robbed the
complaintants. The Ds were convicted of kidnapping, robbery,
and criminal possession of a pistol. The New York Court of
Appeals reversed the kidnapping conviction. A majority of the
judges reasoned that because kidnapping is a very serious crime
with harsh punishment and the offense committed was essentially
robbery, the kidnapping statute should not be applied. The court
reached this conclusion after admitting that the language of the
kidnapping statute might literally apply. People v. Levy, 15 N.Y.2d
159, 204 N.E.2d 842 (1965).
Before 1932 kidnapping was considered a less serious crime than
it is today. In thirty states the penalty for kidnapping was less
than life imprisonment. 26 J. Am. INST. CumM. L.&C. 762 (1936).
In 1932 a rash of kidnappings culminated in the abduction and
murder of Charles Lindbergh, Jr., and to meet the threat of the
sudden outbreak of kidnapping legislatures in most states changed
their statutes or enacted new ones. West Virginia followed a
typical pattern. In 1933 the West Virginia legislature decided to
impose the death penalty for the crime of false imprisonment to
extort ransom. W. VA. CoDE ch. 61, art. 2, § 14a (Michie 1961);
Comment, 67 W. VA. L. REv. 156 (1965).
Kidnapping statutes have changed little from their 1930 form.
They all contemplate the unlawful restraint of the victim. However, they may be divided into three different groups as to the
element of the defendant's purpose. A majority of the state acts
make punishable as kidnapping an unlawful restraint only when
the defendant's purpose was to extort ransom. Other acts are
broader in that the defendant's purpose may have been either to
extort ransom or to rob. A=z. REV. STAT. art. 25, § 13-492 (1965);
CAL. PENAL CODE. § 209; NEV. REv. STAT. tit. 13, ch. 20.320 (1963);
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Wyo. STAT. tit. 6, § 6-58 (1959). A third type has no provision
as to the purpose and can be interpreted as making punishable any
unlawful restraint no matter what the defendant's purpose. DEL.
CoDE tit. 11, § 621(a) (West 1953); CoDE OF MD. art. 27, § 337
(Michie 1957); N.H. REv. STAT. tit. 58, ch. 585.19 (1955); N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 1250 (McKinney 1944). The federal statute, the
Lindbergh law, does not fit into any of the three groups. It makes
punishable the interstate transportation of anyone kidnapped for
the extortion of ransom, "or otherwise." 4 U.S.C. § 1201 (1964).
This language in effect leaves the scope of the federal act to
judicial interpretation.
The problem in the principal case is whether a defendant should
be convicted of kidnapping when the forceable restraint of which
he is guilty was merely incident to the perpetration of another
crime. The answer to this question often determines whether the
court will mete out one punishment or another. The problem
arises under the federal act and under two of the three types of
state acts. These two types are (1) the ones in which the defendant's purpose may have been either to extort ransom or to
rob and (2) the ones in which there is no provision as to purpose.
Prosecutors enforcing statutes of the first type have obtained
convictions of kidnapping where the event was essentially robbery. Similarly, under the second type convictions of kidnapping
have been obtained where the event was essentually assault, rape
or some other crime.
In Chatwin v. United States, 326 U.S. 455 (1946), the Supreme
Court stated that the broad language of the federal statute must
be restricted somewhat in view of the history and setting in which
the act was passed. Events such as those in the Lindbergh case,
State v. Hauptman, 115 N.J.L. 412, 180 Atl. 809 (1935), were
contemplated by Congress when it passed the act. The Supreme
Court intimated that the federal act should not be construed to
make punishable events essentially unlike those in the Lindbergh
case.

The principal case marks the first occasion on which a kidnapping conviction has been overturned because the restraint was
merely incident to the commission of another crime. However,
Justice Edmonds, dissenting in such a conviction, took a similar
position fifteen years earlier. People v. Knowles, 35 Cal. App.2d
196, 217 P.2d 1 (1950).
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In People v. Black, 18 A.D.2d 719, 236 N.Y.2d 240 (App. Div.
1962), the victim of a robbery was kept as a hostage and confined
for a considerable time. In the principal case it was acknowledged
that such events amount to both robbery and kidnapping. However, the distinction between situations in which kidnapping does
and does not occur is not made very clear. Apparently the criteria
to be used are: (1) Were the defendant's actions essentially one
crime? (2) Did the legislature intend to make these actions punishable as kidnapping? (3) Were the actions kidnapping in the
conventional sense in which the term is understood?
The California statute is one under which the problem of the
principal case can arise. The element of purpose is broadly
stated in that the defendant's purpose might be either to extort
ransom or to rob. CAL. PE.A CODE § 209. In People v. Knowles,
supra, the defendant forceably moved a clerk around one room
in a store to facilitate robbing the store. The defendant was convicted of kidnapping. Justice Edmonds argued vehemently in his
dissent that the California legislature could not have meant these
acts to be kidnapping from either a gramatical or historical interpretation of the kidnapping statute. Justice Carter agreed with
Justice Edmonds and further argued that the holding placed too
much discretionary power in the hands of prosecuting attorneys.
He felt they could now turn most robberies into capital offenses
by indicting for kidnapping. The decision has been severely
criticized. Note, 15 ALBANY L. REv. 65 (1951); Note 38 CALIF.
L. lw. 920 (1950); Note, 29 So. CAL. L. REv. 310 (1951); Comment, 3 STAN. L. REv. 156 (1950).
In State v. Jacobs, 93 Ariz. 336, 380 P.2d 998 (1963), the defendant forced a woman to move about her home and a few feet
outside it. During this movement he robbed and raped her. Convictions of robbery, rape and kidnapping were upheld.
The Jacobs and Knowles cases represent essentially the same
position as that taken by the New York courts prior to the principal
case. People v. Florio, 301 N.Y. 46, 92 N.E.2d 881 (1950).
In the future New York should not be confronted with this problem because of its new penal code. The new code did not apply
to the principal case because it does not not go into effect until
1967. Under this act New York will have two degrees of kidnapping. First degree kidnapping requires that either (1) the
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defendant intended to extort ransom; (2) the restraint of the
victim lasted more than twelve hours and was for the purpose of
physically injurying him, or terrifying him, or of advancing the
commission of a felony or of interferring with a governmental
function; or (3) the victim died during the restraint. N.Y. REv.
PENAL LAw § 135.25.
I The Model Penal Code published by the American
Law Institute
foreshadowed the changes recently made by the New York legislature. The Institute urged legislatures to reform their kidnapping
-statutes to prevent abusive prosecution for kidnapping. MoDEL
PENAL CoDE § 212.1, comment (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1960). The
model kidnapping statute requires that the victim be held for a
substantial period of time for the purpose of either (1) ransom,
(2) furthering the commission of a felony, (3) injuring or terrorizing the victim or (4) interfering with a governmental function.
It is further provided that kidnapping is a first degree felony
only when the victim is not released alive in a safe place prior to
trial. MODEL PENAL CODE, § 212.1 (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1960).
These statutes eliminate the difficult problem encountered in
the Knowles, Jacobs and principal cases. Whether courts in other
states will have to wrestle with this problem must be answered
by the legislators or prosecutors in the respective states. As Justice
Carter pointed out in the Knowles case, the question should not
be answered by the prosecutors.
Forrest Hansbury Roles

Domestic Relations-Married Woman's Domicile
H, a resident of Texas, married W, a resident of West Virginia.
After four years of marriage, W returned to West Virginia on
December 26 and seven days later brought suit for divorce on
grounds of cruelty. H moved that the action be dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction. H contended that neither he nor W met the
residence requirements of the West Virginia Code. The trial court
overruled H's motion and granted the divorce. H appealed. Held,
reversed. According to the West Virginia Code, when a suit for
divorce is not based on adultry, one of the parties must have been
a bona fide resident of the state for at least one year prior to the
institution of the suit. When a woman marries, the domicile of
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